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Leibniz and China: A Commerce of Light. By Franklin Perkins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. xvi þ 224.
Reviewed by Robin R. Wang Loyola Marymount University

In December 1697, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) wrote to a Jesuit friend
in China, praising the Jesuit mission there as ‘‘the greatest affair of our time’’ (p. 42).
The purpose of that mission, in Leibniz’s view, was not simply to glorify God and to
spread Christianity; it was also being undertaken for the good of humanity and the
growth of human knowledge. He went on:
For this is a commerce of light, which could give to us at once their work of thousands of
years and render ours to them, and to double so to speak our true wealth for one and the
other. This is something greater than one thinks. (p. 42)

Why was Leibniz, unlike his contemporaries Locke and Spinoza, so enthusiastic
about other cultures, especially Chinese culture? Why, in contrast to the scholars of
today who claim that philosophy is the privilege of the Western mind and who dismiss philosophical exchange as useless, was Leibniz able to understand the importance of cultural exchange? And why is it that his ‘‘commerce of light’’ can still illuminate our path toward wisdom in this age of globalization? In a well-researched
and carefully crafted monograph, Leibniz and China: A Commerce of Light, Franklin
Perkins answers these questions with compelling evidence and persuasive argument.
To emphasize the significance, magnitude, and relevance of cultural exchange
Perkins organizes his book thematically in five chapters. The first chapter provides
the historical context of the world in which Leibniz lived. Perkins cites welldocumented events to illustrate how Europeans first encountered other cultures and
the ‘‘three lenses’’ through which they viewed them (p. 12). This exploration sets the
stage for understanding Leibniz’s knowledge of China and his basic orientation toward learning from diversity.
In chapter 2 Perkins challenges current scholarship and makes the critical claim
that Leibniz’s interest in China and cultural exchange was ‘‘not accidental’’ (p. 45),
but rather flowed from his own distinctive philosophical system. This argument distinguishes Perkins’s innovative approach from the mainstream traditional scholarship on
Leibniz. He claims that Leibniz was ‘‘a more pragmatic, empirical and fallibilistic investigator of the world,’’ that he was ‘‘motivated by practical and theological concerns,’’ and that he was ‘‘a pluralistic thinker’’ (p. 45). To support his argument, Perkins discusses Leibniz’s ‘‘monads’’ in the context of order, diversity, and perfection.
Each monad is a different manifestation of the same universe, yet one unitary universe
is multiplied by its expression in diverse monads. God chose to create a world exemplifying the utmost perfection, with ‘‘the greatest possible combination of order and
diversity’’ (p. 44). Diversity is essential to the perfection of the world since the most
perfect possible world maximizes the greatest order. This intrinsic relation between
order, diversity, and perfection creates an unqualified need for cultural exchange because order requires diversity for perfection, and an ordered diversity only amplifies
the magnificence of its Creator. On a metaphysical level, cultural exchange for Leib-
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niz was ‘‘driven by the value of diversity in the best possible world and the derivation
of diversity from variations in monadic perspectives. On an epistemological level, exchange was driven by the necessary limits of our own perspective and the fact that
monads in distant places have different and complementary perspectives’’ (p. 108).
After laying out the philosophical foundation for cultural exchange in Leibniz’s
system, Perkins turns his discussion to Leibniz’s specific connection with China. In
chapter 3 he offers a historical narrative that traces the development and growth of
Leibniz’s interest in and knowledge of China. Leibniz’s first mention of China was in
his De Arte Combinationis in 1666, when he was only twenty years old (p. 109).
Through his massive correspondence with Jesuits in China and his active social participation in controversies around the Jesuit mission, Leibniz’s knowledge of China
grew in depth and sophistication as the decades passed. His initial approach to
China reflected ‘‘his interest in international politics and economics’’ (p. 113). But
this practical focus was superseded by an interest in culture and a growing desire
to learn from the Chinese. This is described as a switch from the ‘‘commerce of
goods’’ to the ‘‘commerce of light’’ (p. 113). One particular event demonstrates the
extent of Leibniz’s familiarity with Chinese thought: Leibniz saw an association between his binary arithmetic and the hexagrams of the Yijing, and more specifically
with Shao Yong’s 邵雍 (1011–1077) Xiantiantu 先天圖 (Diagram of Prior-Heaven).
This is recorded in a communication to the Paris Academy in 1703 (p. 117), and
the event has become controversial in contemporary Chinese academic circles; the
central dispute is over whether Leibniz saw this tu before or after his discovery of the
binary system.
Another interesting and valuable observation by Perkins is that Leibniz promoted
this exchange of knowledge with the expectation that it should be ‘‘reciprocal’’ (p.
120). In other words, cultural exchange with China should be a two-way interaction,
not just one way—for example, with Europeans like Matteo Ricci (1552–1610)
teaching Chinese about science or building a ‘‘palace of memory.’’ In many respects,
Leibniz put more emphasis on how the Europeans could learn from the Chinese:
‘‘He speaks as if knowledge was a homogenous mass—we can give ours to the Chinese, they can give theirs to us, and we will each have twice as much’’ (p. 121).
To elevate a historical and textual analysis of Leibniz’s engagement with China to
a philosophical plateau, Perkins in chapter 4 critically reconstructs four of Leibniz’s
hermeneutical principles for interpreting Chinese thought. This chapter is extremely
beneficial for its application to the field of comparative philosophy. It reveals how
Leibniz dealt philosophically with another philosophical system that differed from
his own. The first hermeneutical principle is ‘‘the assumption of a shared rationality’’
(p. 160). The assumption of human reason is ‘‘part of a two-sided principle, taking
reason as relatively universal and experience as relatively limited or perspectival’’
(p. 161). This principle combines ‘‘flexibility regarding facts and rigidity regarding
logic’’ (p. 161). Leibniz’s confidence in the universality of reason or a shared rationality suggests a conceptual basis for the resolution of today’s world conflicts.
The second hermeneutical principle is ‘‘the principle of generosity’’ (p. 163).
This refers to ‘‘interpreting a text as saying something reasonable and consistent’’
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(p. 163). In other words, if a text is ambiguous or inconclusive, or one lacks sufficient
knowledge to judge it adequately, one should give a text the benefit of the doubt and
accept the most favorable interpretation.
The third hermeneutical principle is that ‘‘precedence should be given to the ancient texts rather than the modern and their interpretations of classics’’ (p. 163). Like
the Jesuits, Leibniz preferred the classical Confucians over the Neo-Confucians because the classics were more useful for making a European theological apologetic in
the context of Chinese philosophy. Leibniz even convinced himself that he had a
better grasp of Chinese classical thought than the Chinese of his day.
The last hermeneutical principle is a universal principle of interpretation that
allows a ‘‘shifting’’ to take place in the area of cross-cultural understanding. This is
a shifting from forms and concepts that are foreign and unfamiliar to what is more
recognizable and familiar. Leibniz thus takes Chinese philosophy seriously enough
to identify Chinese philosophers with Plato, Aristotle, and even some Christian
thinkers (p. 167). This further illustrates Leibniz’s fair-minded treatment of Chinese
philosophy. Using these hermeneutical principles of interpretation of Chinese texts,
Leibniz synthesized Chinese philosophy into a system of his own that would be applicable to converting the Chinese.
At the end of chapter 4, in an analysis that exemplifies the best in sound, balanced scholarship, Perkins deliberates on Leibniz’s successes and failures as an interpreter of Chinese thought. Leibniz was far ahead of most of his contemporaries in
envisioning the scale of cultural exchange with China, yet, unable fully to escape
the Eurocentric view of his time, he still fell into the trap of orientalism, ‘‘the belief
that orientals were inferior in their ability to reason’’ (p. 194). Leibniz’s other major
failure was his inability to recognize ‘‘the radicality of cultural difference’’ (p. 195).
His assumption that every monad expresses the same universe and the same innate
ideas can be used to perpetuate the presumptuous view that Chinese thought is
just another form of one’s own, and this carries the risk of imposing Western concepts on Chinese tradition. Perkins’s analysis allows us to see that there is a fine
line between the similarities and divergences between European and Chinese culture. A proper appreciation of both can have great significance for future cultural
exchanges.
In chapter 5 Perkins dissects the current situation regarding cultural exchange
and proposes a model for further interactions between cultures, especially an intellectual and philosophical dialogue across cultures. He is concerned that ‘‘academic
philosophers around the world know Plato, Aristotle, and Kant, yet few European or
North American philosophers could even name three non-Western philosophers. It
remains very common for a new Ph.D. in philosophy to have learned nothing of the
thought of any other culture’’ (pp. 199–200). He argues that ‘‘No a priori reason indicates that Western philosophy is so superior to all others as to make philosophical
exchange useless. At the same time, we lack sufficient knowledge to make such a
judgment a posteriori’’ (p. 200). And recognizing the value of different perspectives,
the connection between thought and language, and the principle of fallibilism, he
argues that we should renew the intellectual and philosophical dedication and com-
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mitment to cultural exchange that animated Leibniz three hundred years ago. Between the poles of the Western perception of cultural superiority on the one hand
and the denial of the possibility of cross-cultural normative standards on the other
lies the possibility of cultural exchange. Our acceptance of this possibility must be
‘‘flexible enough that we are open to learning from other cultures, yet fixed enough
to supply some criteria by which to judge both our own beliefs and those of other
cultures’’ (p. 201). A dialectical interplay between relativism and universalism, between difference and similarity, between the variety of experience and rational structure facilitates our understanding of the universe and the human beings within it.
This is the philosophical light Leibniz may help to shine in us.
Perkins’s exceptional scholarship invokes a discussion of the very nature of philosophy itself. The term philosophia derives from two Greek nouns meaning ‘‘love of
wisdom.’’ However, Carl J. Vaught contends that we often fail to notice that love
transcends desire; it is a mistake to reduce the love of wisdom simply to the desire
for understanding (nor is wisdom identical with knowledge; otherwise philosophy
can never be self-sustaining):
The love to which philia points is the love of friendship, and wisdom is both practical and
theoretical. Both philia and sophia call our attention to a way of life in which the philosopher attempts to live on friendly terms with wisdom. Philosophical friendship fulfills desire by pointing to the unity of the philosophical life.1

The love of wisdom goes beyond desire; it constitutes a region of reciprocity for
which the friends of wisdom generate a space for community. There is a hidden dimension underlying the love of wisdom. If the love of wisdom is understood as the
love of friendship, then the love of wisdom will have the properties of friendship.
One of these is a relationship of reciprocity. The love of wisdom is a performative
and intelligible discourse in a community of others. Our community has been
enlarged to encompass the globe, and it would be strange if the love of wisdom happened only in our own backyard. Friendship based on wisdom requires a reaching
out to friends across the world; it is in this way that philosophy will be able to sustain
human society. Confucius saw the inherent connection between individual selfcultivation and friendship: ‘‘The Junzi (cultivated person) bases his association with
friends on cultural refinement (wen) and promotes his cultivation of humanity (ren)
through the support of friendship’’ (Analects 12 : 24).
Perkins has called our attention to the importance of cultural exchange. He has
also demonstrated what solid scholarship should be: accurate in research, faithful to
the primary text, and astute in interpretation. This book is an excellent and timely
resource for anyone involved in the pursuit of philosophical wisdom in the context
of world community.
Note
1 – Carl G. Vaught, Metaphor, Analogy, and the Place of Places: Where Religion and Philosophy Meet (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2004), p. 32.
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